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Abstract
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cieties rely on indefinitely repeated helping games with random matching (Camera et
al., 2013; Camera and Casari, 2014). An important open issue is the lack of a general
proof of existence of an equilibrium capable of supporting the efficient allocation under
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1 Introduction
The two-sided Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is the most common strategic framework
used in the laboratory to study cooperation in indefinitely repeated games. This
game has been adopted both to study cooperation among partners interacting in
a fixed pair (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018), as well as in groups of strangers inter-
acting in pairs that are randomly rematched in each round of play (Camera and
Casari, 2009; Duffy and Ochs, 2009). In the former design, two subjects are placed
in a fixed match at the start of the game and repeatedly play the PD game for
an uncertain number of rounds. In the latter design, subjects from a fixed and
even-numbered group of participants are randomly rematched in each round with
uniform probability, to play the PD with a series of opponents whose identity and
past actions are private information. This design choice is convenient to study
interaction in environments where neither reciprocity nor reputation can be es-
tablished, because it corresponds to the theoretical platform adopted in the social
norms literature initiated by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). That literature
offers a general proof of existence of cooperative equilibrium for groups of any de-
sired size; the theory also offers a characterization of off-equilibrium endogenous
variables. These general theoretical results can be used to determine with a great
deal of precision the set of experimental parameters that are (in)consistent with
cooperative equilibrium; in particular, the size of the group, the probability of the
game ending, and the various elements of the payoff matrix.
More recently, experiments have extended the investigation of cooperation in
groups of strangers to situations in which the interaction is one-sided, being based
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on a “helping game” (Nowak, 2006). Here, only one player takes an action in each
pair, and this is determined by random assignment: in each round, each player is
randomly assigned both an opponent and a role in the pair (active or inactive);
see Camera et al. (2013) and Camera and Casari (2014).
Moving from a two-sided to a one-sided stage game provides both opportu-
nities and challenges for the experimentalist. An advantage is that it makes the
intertemporal nature of cooperation apparent to subjects as each stage is effec-
tively a dictator game. It also makes the design suitable to study the institution of
monetary trade as a possible alternative to informal social norms (see the discus-
sion in Bigoni et al., forthcoming). A challenge is that moving from a two-sided
to a one-sided stage game fundamentally alters the environment if there is private
monitoring, because the lower frequency of actions affects the way in which infor-
mation about defections evolves off-equilibrium relative to a two-sided game. As a
result, this alters off-equilibrium payoffs, and therefore the parameters supporting
cooperative equilibrium in a manner that is opaque because the theoretical litera-
ture neither offers a general proof of existence nor a characterization of cooperative
equilibrium for the case of private monitoring. It follows that the experimentalist
has to establish existence of cooperative equilibrium case-by-case, for the given
experimental group size, as done in Camera and Casari (2014) for example.1 Here
we fill this important gap by generalizing the study of social norms and cooper-
ation to indefinitely repeated helping games characterized by private monitoring
1The problem is not present if there is public monitoring, because in this case the group size no
longer matters since off-equilibrium information about defections is immediately made available
to the entire group (e.g., see Camera et al., 2013).
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and random matching.
There are two main contributions, with both substantive and methodological
value. We derive sufficient conditions supporting full cooperation in sequential
equilibrium for a general population size and a general payoff matrix. We also
characterize the evolution of the key endogenous variables, such as payoffs and
the spread of punishment, off equilibrium. As demonstrated below, these results
can be readily applied to determine the parameters of a laboratory implemen-
tation. Furthermore, the technique we develop in terms of tracking the spread
of information about defections off-equilibrium can be applied to other games in
which actions are one-sided.
To understand how two-sided and one-sided game differ, let us start by recall-
ing what emerges from the study of social norms when the game is a PD. The
studies in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) demonstrate that groups of strangers
can attain the efficient, fully cooperative outcome if two factors are present. First,
the payoff structure should provide incentives to cooperate if everyone else does the
same. Second, players should be capable of tacitly coordinating on an irreversible
punishment process leading to a progressive, contagious cooperation decline in
the group, triggered by any privately observed defection. Sufficient conditions for
these incentives to be present are (i) a low gain from defecting in meetings with
cooperators (the “temptation payoff”), and (ii) a large cost from cooperating in
meetings with defectors (the “sucker’s payoff”). These two conditions are associ-
ated with two distinct threshold values for the player’s discount factor δ, denoted
δ1 and δ2 where [δ1, δ2] 6= ∅. The first condition implies that δ must be sufficiently
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high, δ ≥ δ1, while the second implies that it must be sufficiently low, δ ≤ δ2. Full
cooperation is an equilibrium for δ ∈ [δ1, δ2].
Here we show that moving from a two-sided PD game to the one-sided help-
ing game alters the incentive to cooperate in equilibrium, and also to punish off
equilibrium. Therefore both δ1 and δ2 are affected. Intuitively, in a helping game
with random role assignment a player is passive at random points in time, and in
each period half of the players are passive and half active. Off equilibrium, passive
players cannot protect themselves from the possibility of meeting free-riders, by
choosing to defect—something that instead can be done in the PD game. As a
result, this influences the payoff associated to grim punishment off equilibrium,
and therefore the incentive for an active player to move off-equilibrium by refus-
ing to cooperate. We provide this intuition by fully characterizing the community
punishment process, the off-equilibrium payoffs, and also the thresholds δ1 and
δ2. An application with code to compute the critical equilibrium parameters is
provided to facilitate experimental design (see online Supplementary Materials).
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the grim
strategy we focus on. Section 3 characterizes the contagious punishment process
implied by the grim strategy. Section 4 reports the main result, while Section 5
provides an illustration through a simulation, which is then compared to results
from an experiment. Section 6 concludes.
5
2 Model
The model generalizes the baseline, no token design in Camera and Casari (2014)
to any group size. N = 2n ≥ 4 infinitely-lived players are arranged in consumer-
producer pairs in each period using uniform random matching; roles are randomly
assigned with equal probability in each round. Every pair plays a helping game in
which the producer chooses between C or D (“cooperate,” “defect”), with period
payoffs reported below.2
Producer
C D
Consumer 1, 0 −l, g
Figure 1: The stage game between a consumer and a producer.
Assume g > 0 and 1 > g − l. Cooperation payoffs to consumer and producer are
1 and 0. Note that l can be positive or negative. If positive, then there is no
restriction on the value it can take. However, if l < 0 then the inequality above
implies that l > g− 1, that is l cannot be too small or the surplus would be larger
under the defection outcome than under cooperation.
Players have linear preferences and discount future payoffs with common factor
δ ∈ (0, 1). The ex-ante payoff (unconditional on the role) to player i in the
infinitely repeated game is
E
∞∑
t=0
δtπ(ah,t).
Here, π(ah,t) denotes the payoff to player i when meeting −i; ah,t = C,D is the
2A more detailed discussion of this game is in the Appendix A.1.
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action taken if the round is t; h is a random variable taking either value i or −i
with equal probability, i.e., it selects the producer. In the efficient outcome, every
producer cooperates in every meeting, so the ex-ante payoff is v0 =
1
2(1− δ) , while
payoffs conditional on the role (c and p, consumer and producer) are
vc0 = 1 + δv0 and v
p
0 = δv0. (1)
There is private monitoring: players can only observe outcomes and actions
in their pair and cannot see the history of play of their opponents. We will
investigate if the efficient outcome is sustained in sequential equilibrium by a
trigger strategy whereby a player can be in a cooperative state—where he chooses
C as a producer and is inactive as a consumer—or an irreversible punishment
state, where he chooses D as a producer and is inactive as a consumer.
Definition 1 (Trigger strategy). In round t = 0, the player is in the cooperative
state. In t ≥ 1, the player remains in that state if he has not observed a defection;
otherwise, the player switches to the punishment state.
This strategy encompasses two modes of behavior: cooperation, which corre-
sponds to equilibrium play, and punishment, which corresponds to off-equilibrium
play. The player starts by cooperating (if he is a producer in round 1) and keeps
cooperating as long as he has experienced a fully cooperative outcome in every
past round of play. The player punishes by choosing defection as a producer, if the
player deviated by defecting or observed a deviation from equilibrium play. The
strategy is a social norm if every player (tacitly) coordinates on using it. Because
of private monitoring, off-equilibrium cooperators switch to punishment gradually,
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depending on the realization of random meetings and role assignment. We now
study this community enforcement threat.
The strategy in Definition 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. Unlike the grim punish-
ment strategy used in the PD game, the player who has switched from a coopera-
tive to a punishment state will defect only in a random subsequence of rounds of the
continuation game. The defection takes place at random intervals, T1, T2, T3, . . .
following the first observed defection, in the rounds when the player is a producer.
In all other rounds the player is a consumer and has no action to take.
t−1 t t+T1 t+T1+T2
c p p
T1 T2 T3
deviation
defect defect
cooperation
(in equilibrium)
punishment
(off equilibrium)
Figure 2: Punishment when producer and consumer roles are randomly assigned.
Notes: c = the subject is a consumer, p = the subject is a producer. In capital letters the
number of periods in between two producer roles, where T1, T2, T3, . . . ≥ 1 is the random length
of the interval.
3 The contagious punishment process
Consider an even population of M players. Off equilibrium, partition them into
defectors (punishment state) and cooperators (cooperative state). Cooperators
become defectors at random points in time, via a contagious process described by
the M ×M upper-triangular Markov matrix
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QM :=

Q11 Q12 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 Q22 Q23 Q24 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 0 Q33 Q34 Q35 Q36 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
... . . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . QM−2,M−2 QM−2,M−1 QM−2,M
0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 QM−1,M−1 QM−1,M
0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1

.
Suppose at the start of a round there are k = 1, . . . ,M defectors. Players are
matched and roles are randomly assigned with equal probability. The probability
to transition to k′ ≥ k defectors next round is:
Qkk′(M) =
min(k,M−k)∑
j=k′−k
λkj
(
j
k′ − k
)(1
2
)j
. (2)
Here
λkj(M) :=
j!
(
k
j
)(
M−k
j
)
(k − j − 1)!!(M − k − j − 1)!!
(M − 1)!! ,
is the probability of having j mixed matches (defector-cooperator), where
j ∈

{0, 2, 4, . . . ,min(k,M − k)} if k = even
{1, 3, 5, . . . ,min(k,M − k)} if k = odd.
Given j mixed matches, the probability that k′ − k ≤ j defectors get a producer
role is (
j
k′ − k
)(1
2
)j
.
Summing over all possible numbers of mixed matches that can generate k′−k new
defectors (i.e., k′ − k ≤ j ≤ min(k,M − k)) gives us (2). The properties of this
matrix are described in Camera and Gioffré (2014).
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3.1 Continuation payoffs off equilibrium
Let M = N and vk denote the (ex-ante continuation) payoff to a generic defector,
when k = 1, . . . , N players are defectors (punishment state) and N − k are coop-
erators (cooperation state). Due to uniform random matching, a defector meets a
cooperator with probability σk :=
N − k
N − 1 . Recursively define
vk = σk
1 + g
2 + (1− σk)
g − l
2 + δ
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(N)vk′ ,
where vk′ is the payoff to a defector next round, when there are k′ ≥ k defectors.
Rearranging
vk =
g − l
2 +
1 + l
2 σk + δ
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(N)vk′ .
Letting v := (v1, . . . , vN)T, σ := (σ1, . . . , σN)T, and 1 := (1, . . . , 1)T we have
v = g − l2 1 +
1 + l
2 σ + δQNv ⇒ (IN − δQN)v =
g − l
2 1 +
1 + l
2 σ,
where IN is the N × N identity matrix. Matrix IN − δQN is invertible and we
have (IN − δQN)−11 = (1 − δ)−11, because each element of (IN − δQN)−1 is
non-negative and its rows sum to (1− δ)−1. Therefore,
v = (IN − δQN)−1
(
g − l
2 1 +
1 + l
2 σ
)
= g − l2(1− δ)1 +
1 + l
2 (IN − δQN)
−1σ.
Hence:
vk =
g − l
2(1− δ) +
1 + l
2(1− δ)φk(δ), (3)
with φk(δ) := (1−δ)eTk (IN−δQN)−1σ and ek is the N−dimensional column vector
with 1 in the kth position and 0 everywhere else.
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We present two lemmas and then the main result.
Lemma 1. For k = 1, . . . , N − 1, φk(δ) falls in δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. In Appendix.
Lemma 2. For all δ ∈ [0, 1) we have
δ
2(1− δ) [φ1(δ)− φ2(δ)] = 1− φ1(δ).
Proof. In Appendix.
It is convenient to split defector i’s payoff in two parts depending on whether
he meets a cooperator or a defector:
vk =σk
12
i is a consumer︷ ︸︸ ︷1 + δ N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+1
+12
i is a producer︷ ︸︸ ︷g + δ N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+2

+ (1− σk)
12
i is a consumer︷ ︸︸ ︷−l + δ N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2]

+ 12
i is a producer︷ ︸︸ ︷g + δ N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2
.
If i meets a cooperator (probability σk), Qk−1,k′(N − 2) is the probability that
k′ defectors exit matches between the remaining k − 1 defectors and N − k − 1
cooperators. Hence, the number of defectors grows to k′+ 1 if i is a consumer and
k′ + 2 otherwise. If i meets a defector (probability 1− σk), Qk−2,k′(N − 2) is the
probability that k′ defectors exit meetings between the remaining k − 2 defectors
and N − k cooperators. Hence, next round there are k′+ 2 defectors, independent
of the role assigned to i.
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4 The main result
Proposition 1. There exists 0 < δ1 < δ2 ≤ 1 such that for δ ∈ [δ1, δ2] ∩ (0, 1) the
strategy in Definition 1 supports full cooperation as a sequential equilibrium.
To prove it we establish that: there exists δ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that equilibrium de-
viations are suboptimal for δ ≥ δ1; there exists δ2 ∈ (0, 1] such that off-equilibrium
punishment is incentive compatible for δ ≤ δ2; δ1 < δ2.
Equilibrium deviations: A producer who deviates in equilibrium gains g and
has continuation payoff v2. Using (3), his payoff is
vp1 = g + δv2.
Using vp0 from (1), deviating is suboptimal if
vp1 ≤ v
p
0 ⇔ g + δv2 ≤
δ
2(1− δ) .
Using (3):
g
1 + l ≤
δ
2(1− δ)
[
1− g + l
1 + l − φ2(δ)
]
. (4)
From Lemma 2, rewrite (4) as a function of φ1(δ):
1− g + l
1 + l ≤ φ1(δ). (5)
φ1 maps [0, 1) into (0, 1] and it is a continuous, decreasing function of δ (Lemma
1). Then, it is invertible, i.e., δ = φ−11 (x) for x ∈ (0, 1]. Letting α :=
g
1 + l ∈ (0, 1),
there exists
δ1 := φ−11 (1− α) ∈ (0, 1). (6)
12
Monotonicity of φ1 ensures that for all δ ∈ [δ1, 1) expression (4) is satisfied and
equilibrium deviations are suboptimal.
Off-equilibrium deviations: Suppose there are k defectors and let player i
be one of them. Suppose this player, as a producer, deviates from the action
prescribed by the punishment strategy, cooperating instead of defecting, and will
follow the punishment strategy thereafter. The payoff to player i is:
ṽk =σk
12
i is a consumer︷ ︸︸ ︷1 + δ N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+1
+12
i is a producer︷ ︸︸ ︷0 + δ N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)vk′+1

+ (1− σk)
12
i is a consumer︷ ︸︸ ︷−l + δ N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2

+ 12
i is a producer︷ ︸︸ ︷0 + δ N−2∑
k′=k−2
Qk−2,k′(N − 2)vk′+2
.
In the first line the deviator meets a cooperator (a defector, in the second line).
Comparing ṽk to vk we see that g is replaced by 0 when meeting a consumer, while
vk′+2 is replaced by vk′+1 when meeting a cooperating consumer.
Deviating by choosing C instead of D off equilibrium is suboptimal if ṽk ≤ vk,
for all k ≥ 2, i.e.,
σkδ
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)[vk′+1 − vk′+2] ≤ g, k = 2, . . . , N. (7)
The left-hand side represents the expected gain from slowing down the contagious
defection process; the right-hand side represents the expected loss. Using (3),
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expression (7) becomes
σkδ
2(1− δ)
N−2∑
k′=k−1
Qk−1,k′(N − 2)[φk′+1(δ)− φk′+2(δ)] ≤
g
1 + l , k = 2, . . . , N.
Since σk and φk(δ)−φk+1(δ) fall in k (Camera and Gioffré, 2014, Theorem 2), the
most stringent case is k = 2. Given the first row of QM (with M = N − 2), we
need
σ2δ
2(1− δ)
{
Q11(N − 2)[φ2(δ)− φ3(δ)] +Q12(N − 2)[φ3(δ)− φ4(δ)]
}
≤ α. (8)
For each α ∈ (0, 1), expression (8) always holds if δ is sufficiently small. To see
why, notice that the left-hand side of (8) is an increasing, continuous function of
δ ∈ [0, 1) and it is equal to zero if δ = 0.3 Let δ2 be the maximum value of δ ∈ (0, 1]
such that (8) holds. By continuity, this upper-bound of δ exists for each α ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, deviations off equilibrium are suboptimal for all δ ∈ [0, δ2] ∩ (0, 1).
To conclude the proof of Proposition 1, we need to prove that the interval
[δ1, δ2] is well-defined for each α ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 3. We have δ1 < δ2 for each α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. In Appendix.
3The monotonicity of φk(δ)−φk+1(δ)1−δ follows from Camera and Gioffré (2014, Theorem 2).
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
α
δ
δ2
δ1
Figure 3: Discount factor thresholds δ1 and δ2 for N = 20 and α ∈ (0, 1).
The Lemma reveals that for each α ∈ (0, 1) there always exists an interval
[δ1, δ2] ∩ (0, 1) such that deviations in and off equilibrium are suboptimal for all
δ ∈ [δ1, δ2]∩ (0, 1). Figure 3 displays how the interval [δ1, δ2] changes with α when
we fix N = 20, i.e., when there are 10 pairs playing a helping game in each round.
The shaded area includes all the points (α, δ) that support full cooperation as a
sequential equilibrium under private monitoring, using the contagious punishment
described in Definition 1.
5 An application
This section shows how to apply the technique we have developed, in order to
determine the threshold discount factors δ1 and δ2 to a pre-existing experimental
design. Specifically, we consider the design in Camera and Casari (2014), with
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four players, and in Camera et al. (2013), where there are groups of N = 4, 8, 32
players. In those studies, the payoff from cooperation to a consumer and producer
are a = 20 and b = 2, while the payoff from defection are x = y = 8 for each
consumer and producer. To map those payoffs into the ones described in Table 1 we
normalize all payoffs a, b, x, y first by subtracting b and then dividing by a−b. We
thus have the two cooperation payoffs (a−b)/(a−b) = 1 and (b−b)/(a−b) = 0, and
the two defection payoffs −l = (x−b)/(a−b) = 1/3, and g = (y−b)/(a−b) = 1/3.
In this case α = 0.5. Those games both assume δ = 0.93.
The threshold discount factors. Suppose that subjects follow a grim strategy
of community punishment as describe in Definition 1. That is to say, we conjecture
that subjects react to defections that they have directly experienced in the game,
but not to defections publicly observed in some other match. In this case, Figure
4 reports the exact values of δ1 and δ2 for the groups of N = 4, 8, 32. These have
been calculated using Matlab code reported in Appendix.
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δ
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δ2
Figure 4: Thresholds δ1 and δ2 for N = 4, 8, 32 and α = 0.5.
Notes: Here l = −1/3, g = 1/3 so α = 1/2. These parameters correspond to the experimental
parameters in Camera and Casari (2014) and Camera et al. (2013). ForN = 4 the figure identifies
the threshold discount factors in Camera and Casari (2014). For N ≥ 4, it identifies the threshold
discount factors in Camera et al. (2013) (where there is anonymous public monitoring) under
the conjecture that subjects do not trigger based on publicly available information, but instead
follow a grim strategy of community punishment; this is equivalent to conjecturing that subjects
react to defections that they have directly experienced in the game, but not to defections publicly
observed in some other match.
The value δ2 = 1 for all group sizes. This means that in all those cases players
have an incentive to punish, off equilibrium. Instead, the value δ1 < 1 for all group
sizes and it increases as the group size increases. That is to say, the incentive to
defect in equilibrium instead of cooperating decreases as the size of the economy
grows. In Camera and Casari (2014) and Camera et al. (2013) we have δ = 0.93,
therefore a social norm of community punishment can theoretically support full
cooperation for all group sizes N ≤ 32: we have approximately δ1 = 0.81, 0.87, 0.92
for N = 4, 8, 32 respectively.
This does not mean that players may not be able to support cooperation
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through some other means, of course. For example, in Camera et al. (2013) there
is public monitoring so players could adopt a social norm that triggers punish-
ment based on observation of defections anywhere in the group.4 What we are
doing here is simply identifying if conditions exist that support full cooperation
as a sequential equilibrium under the conjecture that subjects react to defections
that they have directly experienced in the game, but choose to ignore defections
that have occurred in some other match—even if these defections have been made
public. Or, equivalently, for a design in which there is private monitoring. The
calculations reveal that we do not theoretically need public monitoring to support
full cooperation even with 32 subjects.
The decline in cooperation under the norm of community punishment.
Figure 5 traces the share of players who are in a cooperative state following an
initial defection, under the conjecture that everyone follows the grim strategy in
Definition 1. These are not necessarily producers, because roles in each round
are assigned at random, with a coin flip. These are simply players who have seen
(or done) a choice D in one or more of the previous rounds. Hence, they should
choose D this round if they are randomly assigned the role of producer.
The figure shows that by round 10 we effectively expect to see no cooperator if
the group is of size N = 4, 8. This happens by round 15 in groups of size N = 32.
The implication is that in the laboratory, if subjects adopt a grim strategy as in
Definition 1, then we should observe a cooperation rate close to zero, about 10
4This supports full cooperation as an equilibrium for all group sizes as long as δ ≥ 2/3; see
(Camera et al., 2013, Supplementary Information).
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rounds after the initial defection in groups of four players. Below, we visually
compare this theoretical prediction with data from the experiment in Camera
and Casari (2014), which is based on two sessions with groups of N = 4 players,
under private monitoring. This can be informative about whether or not subjects
developed of a social norm of community punishment.
0 5 10 15 200
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
t
N = 4
N = 8
N = 32
Figure 5: Expected share of players in a cooperative state at the start of a round.
Notes: The figure calculates the expected share of players in a cooperative state at the start of
a round t ≥ 1, given that someone moved off equilibrium in round t = 0. This is derived under
the conjecture that subjects follow a grim strategy of community punishment; this is equivalent
to conjecturing that subjects react to defections that they have directly experienced in the game,
but not to defections that might have occurred in some other match, even if publicly observed.
Here t = 1 refers to the round immediately after a player moved off-equilibrium by defecting.
Hence, in t = 1 two players are in a punishment state. The share of cooperators in a group with
N players is 1− d/N where d is the number of defectors at the start of the period.
Realized cooperation in the lab. We start by reporting some statistics about
the Baseline treatment in Camera and Casari (2014) where the group size was
N = 4 and there was private monitoring; the data are taken from that experi-
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ment and discussed in the associated article. There were two sessions each with
twenty subjects. Each session consisted of five consecutive supergames of uncertain
duration. In each supergame subjects were arranged into five groups of four indi-
viduals, using strangers rematching after each supergame. The uncertain duration
was implemented by a random device that was operated during the experiment.
The computer program was calibrated so that there was a 93% probability of con-
tinuation and a 7% probability of termination after each round, starting from the
first round of play. That is to say, δ = 0.93 if we consider players as being risk
neutral. The realized length of supergames varied greatly in the experiment, going
from a minimum of 2 rounds to a maximum of 26 rounds.5
In the experiment many subjects defected in round 1. The left panel in Figure
6 reports the average cooperation rate in a group in round 1, for 50 supergames
pooled as follows: supergames 1-5 all together, and the last supergame 5 by it-
self. The figure suggests that the average group starts with at least one producer
defecting so cooperation is partial from the start. Recall that in each group there
are two producers who take an initial action so when we further study groups we
see that both initial producers defected in 28 percent of groups, one producer de-
fected in 42 percent of groups and only 30 percent of groups had full cooperation
initially. Given that someone defects in round 1 of a supergame, we should see
punishment starting in the second round if players adopted the grim strategy, in
70 percent of the groups. The theory developed above suggests that if subjects
adopted a norm of community punishment as in Definition 1, then the contagious
5For additional details about this experiment see the discussion in Camera and Casari (2014)
and supplementary information.
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punishment process starts immediately in the round following the defection and
leads to a very rapid decline in cooperation. We expect that full defection should
emerge by round 10, as reported in Figure 5.
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Figure 6: Cooperation in round 1 for N = 4 (left panel) and N ≥ 4 (right panel).
Notes: Left panel: data from baseline treatment in Camera and Casari (2014); average realized
cooperation rate in a group of four subjects, in the first round of play, with standard error bands.
We pool together all groups in supergames 1-5 (50 obs.), and, separately, all groups in supergame
5 (10 obs.). Right panel: data from Control condition in Camera et al. (2013); average realized
cooperation rate in a group of N=4,8,32 in the first round of play, with standard error bands.
We pool together all same-size groups in supergames 1-4 (64 obs., per size N=4 and N=8), and,
separately, all 32-player groups in supergame 5 (7 obs.).
To investigate this, consider the dynamics of cooperation in Fig. 7. The left
panel reports cooperation rates in the average private monitoring group of Camera
and Casari (2014), by round of play, for all supergames 1-5 pooled together. The
bands refer to the mean standard error. The maximum duration of a supergame
was 26 rounds, with periods 1-20 capturing 91% of all observations; the expected
number of rounds was 14. Cooperation appears to be volatile. However, it does
not permanently decline until after round 20, and does not reach zero. Average
cooperation was 0.46 in rounds 1-13 and 0.38 in the following rounds. This decline
is slow as compared to what predicted by the grim strategy, according to which
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by round 10 we expect cooperation close to zero. Moreover, average realized
cooperation never hits zero. This suggests that subjects did not coordinate on the
norm of community punishment discussed in this paper. Further evidence comes
from individual-level observations: about 27 percent of players chose C every time
they were producers in a supergame, while about 30 percent always defected in
the supergame. Although “Always C” could be consistent with grim play if these
subjects did not observe any defection, “Always D” is not.
Data from Camera & Casari 2014, N=4
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
A
vg
. G
ro
up
 C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
R
at
e
0 10 20 30 40
Round
Data from Camera et al. 2013
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
A
vg
. G
ro
up
 C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
R
at
e
0 10 20 30 40
Round
N=4 N=8 N=32
Figure 7: Average realized cooperation for N = 4.
Notes: Left panel: data from baseline treatment in Camera and Casari (2014). Right panel:
data from control condition in Camera et al. (2013). See notes to Fig. 7.
It can be especially helpful to compare the results in the N = 4 player groups
under private monitoring, with results from large groups that can exploit a form of
anonymous public monitoring, i.e., a situation in which defections are immediately
detected by everyone in the economy. This is interesting for three reasons. First,
cooperation should be easier to sustain as compared to private monitoring because
a new strategy becomes available: any defection observed anywhere in the group
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can be immediately punished by the entire group (the strategy we study in this
paper, clearly, remains available). This implies that the threshold lower bound for
the discount factor should be lower. Second, the lowerbound δ threshold in this
case is independent of the size of the economy N . Third, a defection should lead
to a more rapid drop in cooperation since everyone can see it, while under private
monitoring this is impossible.
To do so we use the sessions of the Control condition in Camera et al. (2013).
In that experiment, there were different group sizes N = 4, 8, 32 and all players in
the group were informed about the frequency of C and D in their group, at the
end of a round of play, without seeing the identity of actors (anonymous public
monitoring). Each session consisted of five consecutive supergames of uncertain
duration, with strangers rematching after each supergame. The uncertain duration
was again implemented with δ = 0.93 but randomization started on round 3, so
players had three rounds for sure. There were five sessions each of which had size
N = 32 in the last supergame, but that differed in the size N in supergames 1-4:
in two sessions N = 4, in two other N = 8, while in one N = 2. The payoff
matrix was identical to the one in Camera and Casari (2014).6 This is why we
have separately reported supergame 5 in the left panel of Fig. 6.
The right panel of Fig. 6 reports cooperation in round 1, by group size. Again
we see that many subjects defected in round 1. The presence of public monitoring
raised a bit cooperation when we compare similarly-sized groups in the left panel
(N = 4), which is consistent with the lower threshold lowerbound δ under public
6For additional details about this experiment see the discussion in Camera et al. (2013) and
supplementary information.
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monitoring. However, we also see that defections increase with the size of the
group, which is not what is predicted by theory since the size does not affect
thresholds under public monitoring. A possible explanation is that larger groups
entail greater strategic uncertainty, which leads to lower cooperation in round 1
and subsequent, a point that is discussed in Bigoni et al. (2019). Note that N = 4
and N = 8 comprise data from supergames 1-4, while N = 32 only from supergame
5; this allows a direct comparison with rates in the left panel. If subjects used a
grim punishment we should see a drop in cooperation to zero even faster than in
the private monitoring case of the left panel.
The right panel in Fig. 7 refers to data from Camera et al. (2013) separately
for each group size N = 4, 8, 32. We do not draw the mean standard error bands
to avoid cluttering the figure. Given anonymous public monitoring, we expect a
sharper and quicker decline in cooperation as compared to the left panel where
monitoring is private. Yet, the decline is slow as compared to what predicted by
the grim strategy and average realized cooperation never hits zero. Again, these
observations are inconsistent with grim play. To address these observations we
develop a simple behavioral model that can generate partial cooperation as an
equilibrium.
Equilibria with Partial Cooperation: a Behavioral Theory. We develop
a simple behavioral model capable of explaining why in the laboratory groups
managed to sustain partial cooperation, with some players fully defecting and
others fully cooperating. For analytical simplicity and to enhance transparency,
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we work with a large group of players of unit measure. Assume that players can
be of two types, rational or behavioral, in proportion (1 − τ)r and 1 − (1 − τ)r,
respectively. The distribution of these types is known to all.
Rational players choose between two strategies, always defect (AD) and grim
(G), to maximize their payoff. Behavioral players, instead, follow a fixed rule of
conduct that does not necessarily maximize an objective function. Some of these
players are altruists, who always cooperate; their population measure is τ . These
players have a strong pro-social element in their preferences that dominates other
purely economic considerations, so they cooperate with everyone independently of
the history of play.7 The rest, i.e., the population proportion (1 − τ)(1 − r), are
timid punishers; as producers, they cooperate as long as they have never seen a
defection, and otherwise they cooperate with probability q forever after. They do
so because they are uncomfortable defecting every time they are producers, as do-
ing so would surely punish innocent behavioral players. This random punishment
introduces a noise factor.
The presence of behavioral players raises the incentive to choose AD for a
rational player as compared to the case in which all players are rational studied
in Section 2. If all rational players follow G, then full cooperation results and
equilibrium payoffs are identical to those earlier reported. Instead, if rational
players choose AD, then expected payoffs will differ from those reported in Section
4. This model supports partial cooperation if it is individually optimal for rational
players to select AD instead of G. To make this point we must calculate payoffs
7The strength of this pro-sociality may depend on social distance as measured by the size of the
group. For example, one could thus imagine that τ decreases with the group size.
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off-equilibrium. Below, we do so focusing on the least favorable case for AD to be
selected, which corresponds to a public monitoring game because it gives a smaller
incentive to choose D as compared to the case of private monitoring because in
the latter case defections are revealed more slowly, over time, through interaction.
Instead, with public monitoring there is an immediate reaction to the defection
by the entire economy. This also simplifies the analysis because AD corresponds
to the punishment mode of G, so we do not have to worry about the complicated
transition dynamics discuss in Section 3, to make our point.
In fully cooperative equilibrium all rational players selected G. Here everyone
plays C, hence the payoff to any producer is vp0 =
δ
2(1− δ) as seen earlier. Suppose
a rational player, who is a producer, considers deviating from G to AD in fully
cooperative equilibrium. The payoff to this deviator is
v̂p := g + δv̂,
where v̂ := v̂
p + v̂c
2 , is the expected continuation payoff off-equilibrium since the
player has an equal chance to be producer or consumer next round. Here,
v̂c := τ + (1− τ){r(−l) + (1− r)[q + (1− q)(−l)]}+ δv̂,
defines the off-equilibrium payoff to the deviator, if he is a consumer.
Using v̂p and v̂c we obtain:
v̂ = g + τ + (1− τ)[−l + (1− r)q(1 + l)]2(1− δ) .
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Deviating from G to AD is optimal in cooperative equilibrium if
vp0 ≤ v̂p ⇔ δ ≤ δ̄ :=
2g
1 + g − τ − (1− τ)[−l + (1− r)q(1 + l)] .
Depending on the parameters of the game and the distribution of types, we may
have δ ≤ δ̄. If so, there will be partial cooperation because only behavioral players
cooperate, while rational players will always defect. In fact, δ̄ > 1 is possible, in
which case AD is always the optimal choice for a rational player.
Below we demonstrate, using realized choice data from the experiment in Cam-
era and Casari (2014), that δ ≤ δ̄, i.e., the partial cooperation observe in the data
is roughly consistent with the simple theory developed here.
To start, calculate the number of altruists in the data; approximately 27 per-
cent of players chose C every time they were producers in a supergame, hence
set τ = 0.27. Approximately 30 percent of players selected D in all rounds of a
supergame in which they were producers. Using the theory developed above, we
conjecture that these are all rational players who optimally selected AD because
δ ≤ δ̄. If so, then 0.3 = (1− τ)r, so r = 0.41 approximately. Finally, the remain-
ing 43 percent of players cooperated partially, i.e., they are the timid punishers.
The data reveals that these players’ average cooperation rate is 0.47, so we set
q = 0.47. Substituting these value and g = −l = 1/3 (as discussed in Section 5) in
δ̄ we obtain δ̄ = 0.97 approximately, which confirms the conjecture δ = 0.93 ≤ δ̄.
Hence, the simple behavioral theory reported in this section could offer a possible
explanation for the partial cooperation observed in the experiment.
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6 Discussion
Recent experiments have investigated cooperation and the emergence of fiat mon-
etary systems in groups of strangers who face one-sided “helping games,” under
repeated random assignment of roles and opponents (Camera et al., 2013; Camera
and Casari, 2014). This study derived a general proof of existence and char-
acterization of cooperative equilibrium when there is private monitoring. This
generalizes the study of social norms to random matching games other than the
standard Prisoner’s Dilemma. The analysis shows how to calculate the thresh-
old discount factors necessary to support full cooperation, for any payoff matrix
and group size; Matlab codes to perform these calculations are provided in the
Supplementary Materials published online.
The analysis in this paper has general applicability. It can be adapted to study
games where more than one player makes a choice in each round. For example, the
study in Camera and Gioffré (2018) uses this technique in the infinitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma to determine strategies that can support efficient play when
players are “too patient” and therefore the standard grim community punishment
norm is ineffective. This same technique can be applied to study public goods
games, as well as games with asymmetric payoff matrices.
In this paper, we have used this technique to simulate the spread of punishment
predicted by the model and then visually compared it to punishments observed
in the laboratory. This rough comparison reveals a mismatch between theory
and data, suggesting that grim community punishments are not the norm in the
laboratory. This hypothesis can be tested through a formal estimation of the
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strategies adopted in indefinitely repeated helping games. A way to proceed could
be to adapt the technique of strategy estimation of PD games discussed in Dal
Bó and Fréchette (2018), for fixed pairs, and in Camera et al. (2012) for random
matching economies of strangers, to the helping game setting we studied here.
Camera et al. (2012) can offer some insight into the strategies adopted in re-
peated helping games because it estimates strategies in groups of strangers based
on a design having many similarities with that in Camera and Casari (2014) dis-
cussed in Section 5. The main difference is the use of a PD game as opposed to the
one-sided helping game, different payoffs from cooperation, and a slightly higher
continuation probability (0.95 instead of 0.93). The study reports an average co-
operation rate in the first round of a supergame of 67 percent, while the overall
cooperation rate was about 54 percent, numbers that are in line with what we
saw in Section 5. Econometric analysis reveals that only one out of four individ-
uals exhibits behavior that is consistent with the use of the grim trigger strategy.
Subjects showed a tendency to tolerate defections and, as a result, systematic de-
fectors and systematic cooperators often coexisted in a group much as it happened
in the repeated helping games discussed above. This lends further support to the
notion that norms of cooperation based on a grim community punishment scheme,
although theoretically appealing, are uncommon in practice. To explain the data
the theory could be adjusted to incorporate behavioral elements. We have done
so by surmising that at least some individuals act based upon a social component
in their preferences, while others may be hesitant to punish a defection to avoid
affecting innocent individuals.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Helping Game
Here, we describe in a bit more detail the helping game adopted in this paper,
drawing from the discussion presented in Bigoni et al. (forthcoming). Considering
one round of play, the helping game is a cooperative task that involves two players
but is one-sided, i.e., one player is active and the other passive in the round. The
producer and consumer roles are assigned at random as soon as a pair is formed in
the period. We call the active player “producer” and the passive one “consumer.”
Since the game is one-sided, technically speaking it is a decision problem, similar
to a dictator’s game.
One can think of the producer as being endowed with a good at the start of the
round, while the consumer has no endowment at all. Alternatively, one can think
of the producer as being able to make a gift to the consumer (“help”). Either
way, the point is that both would like to consume something but the consumer
has a greater utility from doing so in that round as compared to the producer.
For this reason, the producer is given the option to unilaterally transfer the good
to the consumer. If this occurs, then we say that the producer cooperates or,
equivalently, “helps” the consumer. The other alternative for the producer is to
consume the good himself, or defect or, yet equivalently, to refuse to help the
consumer. This decisional situation is described in Table A1, below.
Table A1: The Helping Game.
Producer’s choice
Help (C) Do not help (D)
Payoff to producer b y
Payoff to consumer a x
Since the producer is assumed to value consumption we have y > b, i.e., the
producer prefers to eat his good instead of giving it away. Since the consumer is
assumed to derive a greater benefit than the producer from consuming the good,
we also have a > y. A central feature of the game is that the consumer’s net benefit
from eating is so large that cooperation is socially efficient, i.e., a + b > x + y.
In the theory section, we have normalized the cooperation payoff to the consumer
and the producer to 1 and 0, respectively, which gives us a defection payoff of
−l = (x− b)/(a− b) to the consumer and of g = (y − b)/(a− b) to the producer
(Figure 1). In Section 5, instead, we have used the payoff matrix in Table A1, with
a = 20, b = 2, and x = y = 8. Repeating this decisional situation indefinitely,
with random counterparts, generates a proper game and is necessary (but not
sufficient) to create dynamic incentives for cooperation.
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Proof of Lemma 1
The derivative of φk(δ), for k = 1, . . . , N − 1 is
φ′k(δ) = −eTk (IN − δQN)−1[IN − (1− δ)QN(IN − δQN)−1]σ,
where we have used dA
−1(δ)
dδ
= −A−1(δ)dA(δ)
dδ
A−1(δ), with A(δ) := IN − δQN . To
prove that φ′k(δ) < 0 if k < N , notice that (1− δ)(IN − δQN)−1σ ≤ σ (with strict
inequality for k ≤ N − 1) since (1− δ)(IN − δQN)−11 = 1 and σk ∈ σ decreases
in k. Therefore, QN(1− δ)(IN − δQN)−1σ ≤ QNσ ≤ INσ. So, we have
(IN − δQN)−1(1− δ)QN(IN − δQN)−1σ ≤ (IN − δQN)−1σ,
which for k = 1, . . . , N − 1 holds with strict inequality.
Proof of Lemma 2
We have
v1 =
1 + g
2 + δQ11(N)v1 + δQ12(N)v2,
which, using (3) and rearranging, becomes
[1− δQ11(N)]
[
g − l
2(1− δ) +
1 + l
2(1− δ)φ1(δ)
]
= 1 + g2 +δQ12(N)
[
g − l
2(1− δ) +
1 + l
2(1− δ)φ2(δ)
]
.
Rearranging,
[1− δQ11(N)]
φ1(δ)
1− δ = 1 + δQ12(N)
φ2(δ)
1− δ .
Using Q11(N) +Q12(N) = 1,
δQ12(N)
1− δ [φ1(δ)− φ2(δ)] = 1− φ1(δ),
and note that Q12(N) = 1/2.
Proof of Lemma 3
It is sufficient to show that there exists a value δ̄2 ∈ (0, 1], with δ̄2 ≤ δ2, such that
δ1 < δ̄2. Since φk(δ)− φk+1(δ) decreases with k, condition (8) holds if
σ2δ
2(1− δ) [φ2(δ)− φ3(δ)] ≤ α,
which is satisfied if
σ2δ
2(1− δ) [φ1(δ)− φ2(δ)] ≤ α. (1)
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Let δ̄2 be the maximum value of δ ∈ (0, 1] such that (1) holds. Since (1) implies
(8), we have δ̄2 ≤ δ2. First we show how to construct δ̄2. Using Lemma 2, (1) is
equivalent to
1− φ1(δ) ≤
α
σ2
⇔ 1− N − 1
N − 2α ≤ φ1(δ), (2)
where σ2 = N−2N−1 .
There are two cases. If α ∈ [N−2
N−1 , 1) then (2) holds for all δ ∈ [0, 1) since
φ1(δ) ≥ 0. Instead, if α ∈ (0, N−2N−1) then the left-hand side of (2) lies in the unit
interval. Hence, by continuity of φ1 there exists a value δ̄2 ∈ (0, 1) such that (2)
holds with equality. Since φ1 is a decreasing function of δ we can conclude that
(2) is satisfied for all δ ∈ (0, δ̄2]. Hence, deviating by cooperating is suboptimal
off equilibrium for all δ ∈ (0, δ̄2] ∩ (0, 1), where
δ̄2 :=

φ−11
(
1− N − 1
N − 2α
)
if α ∈
(
0, N − 2
N − 1
)
1 if α ∈
[
N − 2
N − 1 , 1
)
.
(3)
Now, we show that δ1 < δ̄2. For α ∈ [N−2N−1 , 1) the proof is obvious since δ̄2 = 1.
For α ∈ (0, N−2
N−1), use the definition of δ̄2 and δ1 to derive the inequality
φ1(δ̄2) = 1−
N − 1
N − 2α < 1− α = φ1(δ1).
Since φ1(δ) falls in δ ∈ (0, 1) then φ1(δ̄2) < φ1(δ1) implies δ̄2 > δ1. This completes
the proof.
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